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Abstract
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have become a fixture in the global trade arena.
Their advocates contend that RTAs can serve as building blocks for multilateral trade
liberalization. Their opponents argue that these trade pacts will divert trade from more
efficient nonmember producing countries. This analysis of RTAs finds that U.S. agricul-
ture can benefit from participating in RTAs and may lose when it does not.  Agriculture
is an important source of potential U.S. gains from RTAs.  Regionalism and multilater-
alism are likely to be mutually reinforcing in agriculture.  While the United States, as a
global trader with diverse trade partners, potentially can gain more from global free
trade than from RTAs, many recent RTAs have been more comprehensive in their liber-
alization of agricultural trade liberalization than the Uruguay Round.  A strong multilat-
eral process can help ensure that RTAs are trade creating, rather than protectionist. 
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This overview report summarizes a more comprehensive discussion on the effects of
regional trade agreements on U.S. agriculture.  The contents of that companion report are
shown below. To purchase a copy, call  toll-free: 1-800-999-6779.  Ask for Regional
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Executive Summary
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have become an increasingly important part
of the global trading system. The United States has become an active participant
in RTAs, with memberships in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the U.S.-
Israel Free Trade Agreement.  The United States also has trade initiatives in the
Caribbean Basin.  An important new regional trade agreement is the proposed
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would encompass most coun-
tries of the Western Hemisphere and help reconcile the proliferation of trade
agreements in the Hemisphere into one comprehensive trade pact.  
Regional trade agreements have generated intense debate.  Advocates for  RTAs
emphasize their trade-creating effects.  By providing for freer trade among mem-
bers, RTAs can increase welfare by shifting regional production toward the most
efficient producers, enabling consumers to purchase goods at lower prices.
Opponents of RTAs argue that because most agreements introduce some degree
of trade discrimination, they are likely to divert trade from more efficient pro-
ducers in the rest of the world.  A second issue raised by RTAs is their effect on
multilateral trade negotiations.  Whether RTAs will reinforce or accelerate global
trade talks, or act to slow down or derail them is under debate.
This report analyzes the implications of regional trade agreements for U.S. agri-
culture. Key findings include:
U.S. agriculture can gain from participating in RTAs. By lowering trade barri-
ers among members, the major RTAs in which the United States participates 
NAFTA, APEC and, potentially, the FTAA  are expected to benefit U.S. agri-
culture.  In the long term, their trade-creating effects  increased agricultural
trade and specialization among RTA partners  will increase the efficiency of
U.S. agricultural producers and reduce prices for consumers.  These RTAs are
expected to improve the U.S. international terms of trade in agriculture, with an
increase in U.S. farm export prices relative to import prices.  
U.S. agriculture can lose when not a member of RTAs.  Expansion of the
European Union (EU) is likely to divert agricultural trade and reduce U.S. agri-
cultural exports to the EU and to third markets.  But, the current CAP program is
probably unsustainable with EU expansion, and potential EU farm program
reforms would reduce these negative impacts on the United States.  A U.S. deci-
sion to remain outside the FTAA would divert trade from U.S. agriculture.
However, many expect RTAs to induce economic growth in the Western
Hemisphere.  If this trade-linked growth occurs, the United States is expected to
benefit from the FTAA, even as a nonmember. 
Agriculture is an important source of U.S. gains from RTAs.  Gains from trade
liberalization are roughly proportional to the size of the trade barrier.  BecauseU.S. agricultural exports still face relatively high trade barriers in world markets, the
inclusion of agriculture in trade agreements accounts for much of the U.S. gains from
RTAs.  Over the past decade, RTAs have become more comprehensive in their treat-
ment of agriculture, in contrast to earlier RTAs, many of which excluded agriculture.  
RTAs interact with domestic farm programs.  RTAs limit the ability of member coun-
tries to maintain independent farm programs.  Market arbitrage within a free trade area
will tend to unify prices, making members efforts to use farm support programs to
maintain different price levels either ineffective or costly.  The conversion of most U.S.
farm support into decoupled contract payments is compatible with free trade pacts.  At
the same time, the reduction in farm support and greater market orientation of many
countries farm sectors over the past decade has made RTAs more likely to include agri-
culture, increasing the gains from RTAs.  
In agriculture, RTAs have both trade-creating and trade-diverting impacts, but trade
creation dominates in most RTAs. To date, the empirical evidence shows that the
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations, the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement,
and MERCOSUR (the Common Market of the South, among South American countries)
have led to increased agricultural trade with both partners and nonmembers, supporting
the view that RTAs can unleash growth in trade that benefits members and nonmembers
alike.  When fully implemented, NAFTA, APEC, and the FTAA are expected to be net
trade creating in agriculture. Only the EU has resulted so far in net agricultural trade
diversion.  Its expansion to include Central and East European countries is also expected
to be trade diverting.   
Regionalism and multilateralism are likely to be mutually reinforcing in agriculture.
A strong multilateral process can help minimize the negative aspects of RTAs, and
make it more likely that RTAs will take shape as trade-creating, rather than protectionist
agreements.  In turn, the freer agricultural trade already achieved in the Western
Hemisphere and committed to in APEC is likely to strengthen efforts to achieve freer
trade at the upcoming mini-round.  
The United States can potentially gain more from multilateralism than from RTAs.
Because the United States is a global trader with diverse trade partners, it can potentially
gain more from global free trade than from regional trade agreements.  But so far, multi-
lateral talks have fallen far short of achieving free trade, and the gains to the United
States from the deeper commitments made by RTAs are expected to exceed those from
the Uruguay Round. But the influence of RTAs on the multilateral process is still uncer-
tain, and they hold the potential to harm nonmembers.  Because the two processes can
provide important, mutually reinforcing influences, their joint pursuit can benefit U.S.
agriculture.
ivIntroduction
The United States has been a strong proponent of a
multilateral approach to global trade liberalization.
From the perspective of economic theory, this is unam-
biguously a first best strategy.  The global reduction
of trade barriers raises global welfare as world produc-
tion shifts toward the most efficient producers, and
consumers are able to purchase goods at lower prices.
Regional trade agreements (RTAs), in contrast, can
have both positive and negative impacts. By providing
for freer trade among members, they can improve
resource allocation within the region and generate wel-
fare gains for member countries.  But because they
introduce some degree of trade discrimination, they
can divert trade from more efficient producers in the
rest of the world.  In general, if trade diversion
exceeds trade creation, an RTA reduces global welfare.
Concern over the potential for trade diversion is at the
root of pessimism regarding RTAs.
A second issue raised by RTAs is their relationship to
multilateralism.  The current proliferation of RTAs has
occurred simultaneously with successful global trade
negotiations, which were concluded in 1993 under the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and have continued in a series of
mini-rounds  for specific sectors, including telecom-
munications and services.  In agriculture, a mini-round
of trade liberalization talks is scheduled to begin in
1999 at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the suc-
cessor organization to the GATT.  The current prolifer-
ation of RTAs has generated debate about the dynam-
ics of the relationship between them and the multilat-
eral process of global trade liberalization under the
WTO.  Will regional trade agreements serve as build-
ing blocks for multilateral trade liberalization in the
WTO? Will RTAs have a tendency to expand their
membership as they adopt more open economic poli-
cies  and will this tendency eventually converge on
global free trade?  Could these smaller, regional nego-
tiating groups reinforce or even accelerate the multilat-
eral process by making more progress on difficult
issues  going narrow and deep instead of wide and
shallow?  Or will regional trade agreements tend to do
the opposite, and act as stumbling blocks to multilater-
al trade liberalization?  Will they entrench protectionist
interests that benefit from trade diversion?  Will they
create fortresses that slow or derail multilateral trade
negotiations?  Uncertainty regarding the effects of
regional trade agreements on the multilateral process is
a second reason why some argue that regionalism
could be detrimental to the global trading system. 
Over the past decade, regional integration has gained
momentum, with active U.S. participation. The pursuit
of regionalism by the United States rests on a view
that the trade-creating effects of the current regional
agreements are likely to predominate, for a number of
reasons.  One is that the characteristics of the current
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AN OVERVIEWwave of regional agreements tend to reinforce the
globalism to which the United States remains commit-
ted.  Many recent agreements have locked in domestic
reforms and the opening of economies, reinforcing the
goals of globalism for freer trade, greater market
access, and global efficiency gains.  Recent agree-
ments stand in contrast to those that proliferated in the
1930s, and again in the 1950s and 1960s, many of
which were inward looking, and motivated by protec-
tionism.  
Second, the U.S. pursuit of regionalism, particularly in
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum has been in part a response to some faltering in
the GATT/WTO process.  Regionalism represented a
second best alternative when prospects for multilateral
trade liberalization under the GATT became uncertain
in the early 1990s.  The U.S. pursuit of regionalism
and the prospect of fortresses developing on both
sides of the Atlantic were credited with helping to
bring the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion.
Now, regionalism and multilateralism under the WTO
process are both being pursued, consistent with the
U.S. view that the two processes are mutually reinforc-
ing.  Finally, U.S. participation in regional trade pacts
assures the United States of a continued role in region-
al agreements, which appear likely to move forward
with or without U.S. participation. 
This report analyzes the implications of regionalism
for the United States, focusing on the effects of major
RTAs on U.S. agriculture.  These are the key ques-
tions and findings of this report:
How Will Regional Trade Agreements
Affect U.S. Agriculture?
U.S. agriculture can gain from participating in
RTAs.  By lowering trade barriers among members,
the major RTAs in which the United States partici-
pates   NAFTA, APEC and, potentially, the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)  are expected to
be trade creating.  Increased U.S. agricultural trade
and specialization among RTA partners will generate
efficiency gains for U.S. farm producers and con-
sumers, although this will lead to some adjustment and
change in U.S. agriculture.  The U.S. international
terms of trade in agriculture are expected to improve,
with an increase in farm export prices relative to
import prices.  
U.S. agriculture can lose when not a member of
RTAs.  RTAs divert trade by lowering imports from
the rest of the world as trade with partners increases.
European Union (EU) expansion is likely to divert
agricultural trade and reduce U.S. agricultural exports
to the EU and to third markets.  But, the current
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) program is proba-
bly unsustainable with EU expansion, and potential
EU farm program reforms would reduce these negative
impacts on the United States.  A U.S. decision to
remain outside the FTAA would divert trade from U.S.
agriculture.  However, RTAs are expected to induce
economic growth in the Western Hemisphere.  If this
trade-linked growth occurs, the United States will ben-
efit from the FTAA, even as a nonmember.  Economic
growth in the region will stimulate Latin American
agricultural trade with the United States and raise farm
incomes, although these effects would be larger if the
United States were party to the FTAA.  
Agriculture is an important source of U.S. gains
from RTAs.  Gains from trade liberalization are
roughly proportional to the size of the trade barrier.
Because agriculture still faces relatively high trade
barriers in world markets, its inclusion in trade agree-
ments accounts for much of the U.S. gains from
RTAs.  Recent RTAs have been more comprehensive
in their treatment of agriculture, in contrast to earlier
RTAs, many of which excluded agriculture.  In APEC,
agriculture accounts for 75 percent of total expected
U.S. welfare gains from the RTA.  With or without
U.S. participation in the FTAA, U.S. agricultural trade
will increase by more than other sectors due to the
hemisphere-wide RTA.  In the case of EU expansion,
U.S. agriculture will be affected more than other sec-
tors, but these effects will be negative, while effects on
U.S. manufacturing will be positive.
RTAs interact with domestic farm programs.
RTAs limit the ability of member countries to main-
tain independent farm programs.  Market arbitrage
within a free trade area will tend to unify prices, mak-
ing members efforts to use farm support programs to
maintain different price levels either ineffective or
costly.  The conversion of most U.S. farm support into
decoupled contract payments is compatible with free
trade pacts.  At the same time, the past decades reduc-
tion in farm support and greater market orientation of
many countries farm sectors have eliminated the
inherent conflict between free trade and farm pro-
grams, making RTAs more likely to include agricul-
ture, and increasing the gains from RTAs.
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Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks 
to Multilateralism?
Economywide trade creation effects dominate in
major RTAs, raising world welfare. Concern over
the size of the trade-diverting impacts of RTAs has
been an important argument against regionalism.  Case
studies of the longrun impacts of four major RTAs
(NAFTA, APEC, FTAA, and expanded EU) show that
trade-diversion effects are likely to be smaller than
trade-creation effects.  Because they are expected, on
net, to create trade, these RTAs will improve global
welfare. These findings suggest that these RTAs will
fulfill the intent of the GATT/WTO rules that permit
RTAs: their gains from liberalizing internal trade at a
pace faster than committed to in the Uruguay Round
will outweigh the negative impacts that result from
their discrimination against nonmembers.
In agriculture, RTAs have both trade-creating and
trade-diverting impacts, but trade creation domi-
nates in most RTAs. The Australia-New Zealand
Closer Economic Relations (CER), the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), and MERCOSUR
have led to increased agricultural trade with both part-
ners and nonmembers, supporting the view that RTAs
can unleash growth in trade to benefit members and
nonmembers alike.  When fully implemented, NAFTA,
APEC, and the FTAA are expected, on net, to create
trade in agriculture. Only the EU has resulted so far in
netagricultural trade diversion. Itsexpansion toinclude
Central and Eastern European countries is also expect-
ed to be trade diverting.  While trade-creating RTAs
are likely to pursue more open markets at multilateral
talks, trade-diverting RTAs are less likely to do so.     
Recent RTAs have committed to deeper agricultur-
al trade liberalization than agreed to in the Uru-
guay Round. Smaller regional negotiating groups, the
reduction and decoupling of domestic farm support in
some RTAs, and a policy paradigm shift in many
countries toward more open markets may account for
commitments by recent RTAs, particularly in the
Western Hemisphere, to a comprehensive liberalization
of agricultural trade. This trend is likely to create a
stronger constituency for meaningful trade reforms in
the upcoming WTO mini-round on agriculture.    
Regionalism and multilateralism are likely to be
mutually reinforcing in agriculture. A credible mul-
tilateral process has already proven to be an important
element in the agricultural trade liberalization achieved
in some agreements.  In the future, multilateral com-
mitments to reduce protection and support in agricul-
ture could be pivotal in influencing the directions to be
taken by APEC and an expanded EU on farm policy
reforms and the pace of regional agricultural trade lib-
eralization.  In turn, the freer agricultural trade already
achieved in the Western Hemisphere and committed to
in principle in APEC is likely to strengthen efforts to
achieve freer trade at the upcoming mini-round.  
What Are the Policy Implications 
for U.S. Agriculture? 
It is important that RTAs achieve their commit-
ments to liberalize agricultural trade. While some
recent RTAs have defined a time frame for liberalizing
substantially all agricultural trade (NAFTA, MERCO-
SUR),  specific reduction commitments have not been
defined in APEC, and the treatment of agriculture in
the FTAA is still to be negotiated. Progress in the mul-
tilateral talks on reducing barriers to agricultural trade
could influence these undefined aspects of RTAs.
RTAs that selectively liberalize trade make the trade-
diverting effects of RTAs more likely to dominate.  
A strong multilateral process can help minimize the
negative aspects of RTAs. Studies in this report find
that most RTAs have trade-diverting impacts in agri-
culture, although they are smaller than their trade-cre-
ating effects.  Protectionist aspects of RTAs include:
closed memberships and the adoption by members of
common, distorting internal policies, as in the EU;  the
exclusion of some sensitive agricultural commodities,
as in NAFTA; and the adoption of common external
tariffs with agricultural tariff escalation, as in the
Andean Pact and Central America Common Market
(CACM).  A strong multilateral process that effectively
disciplines the negative aspects of RTAs makes it
more likely that RTAs will take shape as trade creat-
ing, rather than protectionist agreements.   
The United States can potentially gain more from
multilateralism than from RTAs. However, multi-
lateral talks have fallen far short of achieving global
free trade.  Economywide U.S. welfare gains from the
Uruguay Round are less than those expected from all
RTAs combined.  Although the regional initiatives
have made significant commitments for opening trade
with key U.S. partners, the potential remains for large,
additional U.S. welfare gains from achieving global
free trade.  Agriculture accounts for much of these
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United States of pursuing both regional and multilater-
al agricultural trade initiatives.   
Regionalism and Multilateralism:
What Do They Mean?
Regionalism
Regionalism, regional trade agreement, and
regional trade area are general terms that refer to a
commitment among a group of countries to achieve
some degree of economic integration. The terms refer
to the whole spectrum of levels of economic integra-
tion (table 1). The most common type of regional inte-
gration is a free trade area, in which internal trade bar-
riers are removed but members maintain independent
trade policies toward nonmembers. The free trade
agreement among the United States, Canada, and
Mexico is an example of a free trade area. The most
comprehensive RTA is an economic union, in which
members remove all internal trade barriers, permit the
free movement of capital and labor, erect common
external trade barriers, and unify their fiscal and mon-
etary policies. The EU, as it moves toward the adop-
tion of a common currency, is an example of an eco-
nomic union.  
Two agreements analyzed in this report are not includ-
ed in table 1.  APEC is a regional trade initiative, but
not a formal RTA.  Likewise, formal negotiation of the
FTAA has just begun.  The level of economic integra-
tion it will achieve is unknown, although it is not
expected to become an economic union.  APEC and
the FTAA differ from RTAs in some important
respects.  A key characteristic of both is their inclusion
of countries as well as existing trade agreements as
components.  APEC includes the AFTA and NAFTA
agreements, among others; while the FTAA includes
NAFTA and MERCOSUR, among others. One role for
these initiatives is to reconcile, and possibly to build
on, the proliferation of RTAs.  While these suprana-
tional negotiating initiatives might better be termed
free trade networks (Josling, 1998), for convenience
they will be referred to as RTAs in this report.    
Regional trade agreements have become a significant
part of the global trading system. Between 1947 and
1994, 109 regional trade agreements were reported to
the GATT, nearly equal to the number of countries that
are GATT members (see article by Sheffield, in the
companion report).  Since 1995, at least 16 new RTAs
have been reported to the WTO.  RTAs have been es-
tablished in every region of the world.  In the Western
Hemisphere, for example, about 40 trade agreements
are currently operating, and at least a dozen others are
under negotiation (see articles in the companion report
by Diao/Somwaru/Raney; and Stout/Ugaz-Pereda).
Nearlyall WTOmembers are party to at least oneRTA.
RTAs have taken different approaches to reducing bar-
riers to agricultural trade. Most of the recent major
RTAs have included agriculture in the removal of
internal trade barriers, particularly in the Western
Hemisphere (table 2).  However, some of the European
agreements have only partially liberalized internal
agricultural trade.  In most recent agreements, most
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Table 1 — Selected RTA’s and levels of economic integration   
Type Regional trade area Level of integration
Free trade area NAFTA, US-Israel FTA,  Members eliminate tariffs among themselves but 
CEFTA, EU-CEE  keep their original tariffs against the rest of the 
Association Agreements,  world
Australia-New Zealand CER
Customs union MERCOSUR, Andean Pact,  Members eliminate tariffs among themselves and
CACM adopt a common tariff against the rest of the world
Common market European Economic  Members eliminate tariffs among themselves, 
Community adopt a common external tariff, and remove 
impediments to movements of factors of 
production across member countries.
Economic union European Union Members move beyond the common market to
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Table 2--Summary of selected RTA’s and their agricultural provisions
RTA Created Current members Agricultural provisions
European  1958 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland No internal trade barriers
Union (EU) (EEC-6) France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,  Common Agricultural Policy (unified trade
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, policy and support)
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom
Closer Econ- 1983 Australia and New Zealand Free trade in agricultural products
omic Relations 
(CER) Agreement
U.S.-Israel FTA 1985 U.S., Israel Agriculture is covered, but Israel was granted the
right to protect infant industries, particularly in 
agriculture. 1996 Agreement designed to further 
liberalize agriculture trade particularly U.S.
products facing nontariff barriers.
Asia-Pacific  1989 Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Goal of free trade in agricultural products by 2010
Economic   China, Hong Kong, Indonesia,  for developed economies and by 2020 for developing
Cooperation  Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New  economies.
Forum (APEC) Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, United  
States. Peru, Russia, and Vietnam 
became members in 1998.
Southern  1991 Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,  Nearly all intra-regional tariffs removed, only exempt
Common Paraguay agricultural product is sugar. Established Common
Market  External Tariff, ranging from 0-20 percent for 
(MERCOSUR) agricultural products (avg. 10 percent)—generally 
lower than previous tariff levels.
Association  of 1991 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,  Transition to FTA with CET planned by 2003.
Southeast Asian Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, All agricultural products are included.
Nations Free Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar
Trade Area 
(AFTA)
Central Euro- 1992 Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Scheduled to fully liberalize agricultural trade in
pean Free Trade  Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania 1998, postponed until 2000
Association 
(CEFTA)
EU-CEE  1992 EU and Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Separate protocol for agriculture: 5-year phase-in 
Association  Lithuania, Poland, Romania,  for most concessions, limited to tariff decreases
(“Europe”)  Bulgaria, Czech Republic,  and quota increases.Trade in some products, 
Agreements Slovenia such as grains, not liberalized.
North Ameri- 1994 Canada, Mexico, United States Most agricultural tariffs between Canada and U.S.
can Free  (CUSTA, eliminated by Jan. 1, 1998; restrictions on 
Trade Agree-  1988) sensitive products remain (dairy, poultry, eggs, sugar 
ment (NAFTA) containing products). Agreement not to use export
subsidies in bilateral trade and not to increase or 
introduce new tariffs. 15-year phase-out of all tariffs, 
quotas, and licenses that are barriers to U.S.-
Mexican agricultural trade. 15-year phase-out of
tariffs, quotas, and licenses for most Canadian-
Mexican agricultural trade.
Source: Sharon Sheffield, “Agriculture, the GATT and Regional Trade Agreements,” in the companion report, AER-771.farm products are included, although sensitive agricul-
tural products are either given long transition periods
or excluded (notably, dairy, poultry, and eggs in
NAFTA; sugar in MERCOSUR). 
Global agricultural trade has become increasingly re-
gionalized, in some cases in advance of formal region-
al trade agreements.  Thomas Vollrath (see article in
the companion report) analyzed the agricultural trade
patterns of the 34 member countries of six RTAs.
Collectively, these countries accounted for 62 percent
of global trade from 1970 to 1995.  While their share
of global trade is stable, the share of trade within these
regions relative to their trade outside the region
increased from 30 percent in 1970 to 40 percent by
1995.
Multilateralism
Like regionalism, multilateralism is a general term
that has several meanings.  In this report, we define
multilateralism as the multilateral negotiation of global
trade liberalization.  While multilateralism was
strengthened by the completion of the Uruguay Round,
full liberalization of global trade has not yet been
achieved, and some trade barriers will likely remain
for some time.  The definition of multilateralism is
important when the question is: How does regional-
ism relate to multilateralism?  In theory, global free
trade is optimal, but this has less policy relevance than
a comparison of RTAs, many of which have achieved
substantially free trade, with a multilateral process that
still contains many remaining trade barriers.  
Multilateralism also refers to the lowering of trade bar-
riers on a nondiscriminatory, Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) basis, in which any tariff concessions granted
to a partner are also extended to the rest of the world.
An example of this is the open regionalism approach
of APEC.  Under open regionalism, members of APEC
reduce their import barriers against both other mem-
bers and the rest of the world.  This MFN-based
approach by an RTA can benefit all countries, but there
is the danger that nonmembers will free ride and
accept an RTAs tariff reductions without lowering
their own barriers.
The Welfare Effects of RTA’s
Trade creation, trade diversion, and terms of trade
effects constitute the welfare impacts of an RTA (see
appendix on the Economics of Regionalism).  Trade
creation refers to the increased trade within an RTA
when internal tariffs are lowered or removed.
Production efficiency increases when a member
imports more from a lower cost RTA partner, and its
own high-cost domestic production falls. Trade diver-
sion occurs when a member shifts its imports from
more efficient, nonmember producers to less efficient
partner countries within the RTA. Regional trade
agreements are likely to have both trade-creating and
trade-diverting impacts, and which effect will domi-
nate depends on many factors.  
The effect of RTAs on consumers is also important to
consider.  Trade creation benefits consumers because
they can buy imported goods that are produced at
lower cost than the domestic variety.  Lower prices, in
effect, raise consumer income.  Increased income and
consumption may cause consumers to import more
goods, and through this trade expansion the RTA could
even benefit nonmembers.
RTAs also have terms of trade impacts: changes in the
supply of and demand for traded goods will lead to
changes in export and import prices for both members
and nonmembers.  An improvement in terms of trade
is good for a country; it means a given level of exports
buys more imports, which increases consumption and
welfare.  
Welfare is the sum of trade creation, trade diversion,
and terms of trade impacts.  In most analyses dis-
cussed here, welfare is measured in terms of  equiva-
lent variation,  which measures the cost to consumers
of the same bundle of goods, before and after entering
an RTA. Welfare improves if the bundle of goods costs
less as a result of the RTA, but deteriorates if the bun-
dle of goods costs more.   
There are other sources of welfare gains from an RTA
in addition to the static gains described here.  RTAs
can lead to dynamic gains if they stimulate invest-
ment, or if trade leads to productivity growth through
technology transfers or learning by doing.  RTAs can
also lead to a rationalization within industries, with
fewer companies specializing in production for a larg-
er market, while less efficient producers close down.
Studies in this report focus on the static welfare
impacts of RTAs, except for the analysis of the FTAA,
which links trade with increased investment and pro-
ductivity growth.
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The studies in the companion report include two glob-
al assessments of RTAs: a historical analysis of the
impacts of six RTAs on world agricultural trade dur-
ing 1970-95, by Thomas Vollrath, and an analysis of
the expected impacts of five RTAs on U.S. and global
trade and welfare by Mark Gehlhar.  There are region-
al case studies of four RTAs   an expanded EU,
APEC, FTAA, and NAFTA.  The first three case stud-
ies analyze RTAs under alternative assumptions about
membership or internal policies, reflecting the current
uncertainty about the conditions of their implementa-
tion.   EU enlargement is analyzed under the assump-
tions that the support presently provided under its CAP
is extended to the Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEEC), and alternatively, that significant
CAP reforms are implemented simultaneously with
enlargement.  APEC is analyzed as both a preferential
free trade area, and as an MFN-based RTA, in which
members adopt open regionalism and extend their
trade liberalization to both members and nonmembers
of APEC.  Regional integration in the Western
Hemisphere is analyzed under the two assumptions
that the United States does and does not join the
FTAA.  This construction of model experiments pro-
vides a measure of potential U.S. gains from the
FTAA.  In the case of NAFTA, the interactions of the
RTA and recent domestic farm program reforms are
analyzed.  
The global analysis by Mark Gehlhar and most region-
al analyses use multi-country, computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models, which are described in an
appendix in the companion report.  CGE models are
economy-wide and take into account linkages between
agriculture and other sectors through intermediate
demand and factor markets.  These models focus on
sectoral resource allocation, production, and trade.
They solve for prices, wages, and the real exchange
rates that equilibrate product markets, factor markets,
and the balance of trade between countries.  The
analysis of EU expansion by Leetmaa,  Jones, and
Seeley uses ESIM, a partial equilibrium model of the
European agricultural sector.  This model has more
disaggregation of  EU agriculture than is now avail-
able in a CGE model, and includes detailed modeling
of EU farm programs.  Both the CGE models and
ESIM provide controlled simulations of the impacts of
RTAs only, and do not provide actual long-term pro-
jections of the U.S. or world economies. 
A Global Assessment of RTA’s
In the global analysis, Gehlhar finds that all RTAs
combined, including those already being implemented
(NAFTA and MERCOSUR) and proposed RTAs (an
FTAA that includes the United States, APEC under
open regionalism, and EU expansion), will raise world
welfare by $49.6 billion (table 3).  Of this total welfare
gain, $47.6 billion is due to APEC (assuming open
regionalism), reflecting the large role of APECs
members in the world economy, and the relatively high
trade barriers in Asia.  RTAs contribute more to world
welfare than did the Uruguay Round (UR) of the
GATT.  This is because RTAs are assumed to achieve
full trade liberalization in all sectors, compared with
the partial trade liberalization achieved in the Uruguay
Round.  Yet, even these comprehensive RTAs leave
considerable scope for further gains from multilateral
trade liberalization.  World welfare could increase by
an additional $62 billion under global free trade. 
The global analysis identifies some important interac-
tions among RTAs.  One example is the conclusion
that NAFTA could result in a small reduction in world
welfare, although the United States is expected to gain
from its membership.  Most of the welfare loss would
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Table 3—Global and U.S. welfare impacts of
regional and multilateral trade liberalization  
Trade agreement  Global   U.S.
impact impact  
Billion dollars 
Uruguay Round  33.7 4.6 
NAFTA -.58  2.32 
MERCOSUR .80  -0.36 
FTAA-USA .34  -.34 
FTAA+USA 1.32  3.28 
EU Expansion 
(no CAP reform after 1992)  .48  -.6 
APEC (preferential trade area)  36.47  11.3 
APEC (open regionalism)  16.95  -8.92  
Total RTA’s  49.62  6.68 
Global free trade (after RTA’s)  62.0  7.51 
Notes: Experiments are conducted sequentially.
Results show the incremental welfare impact of individual
trade  reforms.The net effect of APEC on the U.S. is a $2.4
billion welfare gain.
Source: Mark Gehlhar, “Multilateral and Regional Trade
Reforms: A Global Assessment from a U.S. Perspective,” in
the companion report.occur in Asia and stems from policy distortions in
Asian agriculture, including high import protection
and other farm support.  NAFTA slightly increases
farm production in Asia, and this movement of addi-
tional resources into a highly distorted sector could
lower Asian welfare.  If Asian countries remove their
trade distortions, as committed to under the APEC
agreement, global welfare losses due to NAFTA will
be eliminated.  A second example is the effect that EU
enlargement and farm program reforms may have on
U.S. gains from APEC.  If APEC adopts open region-
alism rather than trade preferences, U.S. agriculture
would face greater competition in Asian markets from
subsidized EU agricultural producers and from other
countries.  If EU enlargement is accompanied by
reduced farm support, as expected, then U.S. benefits
from APEC under open regionalism will increase.  
Major RTA’s Increase World 
and U.S.Welfare
In table 4, we report the global and U.S. welfare
impacts from the regional case studies.  An important
difference between the regional and the global analy-
ses is that the global analysis, which is sequential,
incorporates additional trade liberalization into each
base.  Regional case studies isolate the impact of a sin-
gle RTA, and enrich the analysis by incorporating
additional sectoral or policy detail in agriculture, or by
including the dynamic gains from RTAs.  All regional
case studies of the prospective effects of RTAs find
that in aggregate (but not necessarily in agriculture)
their trade-creation effects dominate trade diversion.
The size of the trade-diverting impacts of RTAs has
been an important element in the debate over RTAs.
We find that their trade-diversion effects are smaller
than their trade-creation effects.  Because they are net
trade creating, these RTAs improve global welfare.
While the global welfare impact of an RTA is impor-
tant, much of the concern about RTAs relates to the
distribution of welfare effects between members and
nonmembers. Although all RTAs are net trade creat-
ing, most have some trade diversion effects that hurt
nonmembers.  In this report, we find that the United
States benefits from the RTAs in which it is a member
(NAFTA, APEC, FTAA).  Increased trade and low
trade diversion generate efficiency gains and raise U.S.
welfare.  We also find that U.S. welfare may increase
even when it is not an RTA member.  In the two such
cases examined in this report (FTAA without U.S. par-
ticipation, EU expansion), two different factors are
important: the economic growth associated with
RTAs, and the interaction of trade liberalization with
other domestic policy distortions.    
RTAs can stimulate foreign investment, capital stock
growth, and productivity gains, and this economic
growth increases the benefits from free trade.  These
potential dynamic gains from an RTA are captured in
the regional case study of the FTAA by Diao,
Somwaru, and Raney.  The starting point of the
dynamic FTAA analysis is the observation that as a
result of market-oriented policy reforms in many Latin
American countries in the 1980s, trade has increased
and economic growth has accelerated.  Assuming that
trade and productivity growth are linked, the increased
trade under Western Hemisphere RTAs is likely to
lead to strong economic growth in the Hemisphere.
Economic growth will lead to an expansion of trade
that benefits the United States.  Western Hemisphere
integration (including the Uruguay Round, NAFTA,
and MERCOSUR) could lead to a $5.7-billion
increase in U.S. welfare in the short run. U.S. partici-
pation in the FTAA could generate additional welfare
gains of $7 billion.  The global analysis by Gehlhar
concurs that there are costs to the United States from
not participating in the FTAA.  The static, global
analysis does not take into account dynamic productiv-
ity increases related to trade, and concludes that U.S.
welfare declines if the United States does not partici-
pate in the FTAA.  
EU expansion provides an example of how domestic
policy distortions interact with trade liberalization.
(Domestic farm policies and RTAs are discussed in
more detail below).  In Liapis and Tsigas analysis of
EU expansion, the CEEC is assumed to adopt internal
EU policies, including 1992 farm price supports.  This
would reverse a policy structure within the CEEC
countries that previously subsidized manufacturing and
taxed agriculture.  As the policy incentives are
reversed with EU accession, and CEEC manufacturing
output declines, U.S. manufacturing will likely gain.
U.S. manufacturing gains are likely to be sufficient to
outweigh losses to U.S. agriculture, and result in a
small, net welfare gain for the United States.  The
regional analysis finds a small net welfare gain ($240
million) for the United States from EU expansion
while the global analysis finds a small welfare decline
($600 million).  The regional analysis probably over-
states the welfare gain to the United States because it
assumes that U.S. farm programs are coupled to pro-
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U.S. subsidy expenditure and contributes to the U.S.
welfare gains.  Both the global analysis and the
regional case study share a key conclusion regarding
EU expansion to central and eastern Europe: the
aggregate economic impacts on the United States are
likely to be small.      
U.S. welfare could improve due to its membership in
APEC, whether as a preferential trade agreement or
under an open regionalism agreement.   However,
U.S. welfare gains are smaller under open regionalism.
This is because nonmembers can free ride and
accept APEC tariff reductions without an obligation to
reciprocate.  Some of the loss to the United States
from free riding occurs in agriculture, which faces
greater competition and downward pressures on export
prices in the APEC market, compared with a preferen-
tial RTA.  These terms-of-trade losses account for the
relatively smaller gains to the United States from open
regionalism.  Free riding may not, however, be a stable
equilibrium.  Coyle and Wang find that free riders bal-
ance of trade worsens under open regionalism because
they become uncompetitive in global markets if they
maintain their own tariffs on imported intermediate
inputs into consumer or capital goods.  This gives non-
APEC countries an incentive to undertake similar trade
liberalization.  The uncertainty about whether free rid-
ing is likely to occur has raised concerns about open
regionalism in the APEC framework.  Nevertheless,
open regionalism is considered to be an ideal form of
RTA because it eliminates the possibility of trade
diversion.    
U.S. Agriculture and 
Regionalism
We consider the effects of regional trade agreements
on U.S. agriculture from two perspectives.  First, from
a sectoral perspective, we can ask the same questions
about the U.S. agricultural sector as we do for the U.S.
and the global economies: Is the RTA, on net, trade-
creating or trade-diverting?  Do terms of trade improve
for U.S. agriculture?  But, welfare cannot be addressed
at the sectoral level because it is an aggregate meas-
ure; it represents the sum of  RTA impacts that are
likely to differ by sector.
Second, we consider the more complex question of the
relationship between regionalism and domestic policy,
particularly farm support programs.  Many countries
provide their farmers with price or income support,
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Table 4 — Regional case studies: Global and U.S. welfare impacts of selected RTA’s   
Trade agreement  Model type  Global impact  U.S. impact 
Billion dollars 
EU Expansion (no CAP reform   CGE  (Liapis & Tsigas)  1.6  0.24
after 1992)
EU Expansion + CAP reform  CGE  (Liapis & Tsigas)  6.8  0.30 
Western Hemisphere  Intertemporal dynamic CGE    18.5-174.61 5.76-42.821
integration (FTAA - USA) (Diao, Somwaru, Raney)
Western Hemisphere  Intertemporal dynamic CGE    26.6-263.21 12.76-83.861
integration (FTAA + USA) (Diao, Somwaru, Raney)
Net FTAA effect on U.S. Intertemporal dynamic CGE 8.1-88.6 7.0-41.04
(Diao, Somwaru, Raney)
APEC (Open Regionalism)  Recursive dynamic CGE (Coyle and Wang)   3102  38.52
APEC (Preferential Trade Area)  Recursive dynamic CGE (Coyle and Wang)   2332 57.12
NAFTA  CGE (Burfisher, Robinson, Thierfelder)  N.A. 0.46
N.A. means scenario was not run by that model, or not able to be calculated given the model structure.
1 Range of results of the regional case study are from an intertemporal dynamic CGE model. The first numbers are obtained
for the short term and the second numbers are for long-term equilibrium. The effects of NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and the
Uruguay Round of the GATT are included in both scenarios. The differences between the two scenarios are caused by
whether the United States joins the  FTAA.
2 Results of the regional case study are from a recursive dynamic CGE model. Results reported are for 2020, and take into
account the exogenous capital, labor, and productivity growth that occur between 1992 and 2020.and import protection or export subsidies.  How does
free trade within a region affect members domestic
farm programs?  Conversely, how have RTAs been
affected by the unilateral, domestic policy reforms
adopted by many countries in the 1990s,  particularly
in agriculture?
Most Existing RTA’s Have Created 
Trade in Agriculture
Vollraths historical analysis of agricultural trade dur-
ing 1970-95 finds that three RTAs  the Australia-
New Zealand CER, the CUSTA, and MERCOSUR 
have been net trade-creating in agriculture. The
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), whose members are
competitive rather than complementary in agricultural
production, displays no evidence of having influenced
agricultural trade flows.  Of the major RTAs analyzed,
only the EU has resulted in agricultural trade diver-
sion.  Because the NAFTA and APEC RTAs are not
yet fully implemented, it is too soon to assess their
impacts on agricultural trade.     
U.S. Agriculture Mostly Benefits from
Prospective RTA’s
U.S. agriculture is expected to gain from its member-
ship in RTAs (NAFTA, APEC, FTAA).  Regional case
studies found that increased agricultural exports and
imports will generate efficiency gains, contributing to
welfare gains.  Agricultural trade creation is expected
to exceed trade diversion and, in NAFTA and APEC,
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Table 5--How regional trade agreements affect U.S. agricultural trade
Regional trade agreements Regional trade agreements
excluding the United States    including the United States  
EU expansion EU expansion Western  Western APEC APEC NAFTA
+ CAP  (no  CAP  Hemisphere  Hemisphere (Open  (preferential
reform reform after  integration integration regionalism) trade area)
1992) (FTAA-USA) (FTAA+USA)
ESIM partial  CGE   Intertemporal Intemporal Recursive dynamic CGE
equilibrium  (Liapis & dynamic dynamic CGE (Coyle and (Burfisher,
(Leetmaa, Tsigas)  CGE CGE Wang)3 Robinson,
Jones and  (Diao, (Diao, Thierfelder)
Model Seeley)1 Somwaru, Somwaru,
Raney)2 Raney)2
Million dollars 
Change in total   —  -15    980  1,810  19,800  14,200  258
U.S. ag. imports
Change in total       —       -834   2,530  3,300  75,700  90,500  248
U.S. ag. exports
Change in U.S. ag. —       44   980  2,080  8,000  12,100  270 
imports from RTA
Change in U.S. ag. —      -400   1,660  2,800  79,000  101,000  582
exports to RTA
Net impact  Likely  Diverting   Creating   Creating  Creating  Creating  Creating
diverting 
Change in intl. ag. Likely Shortrun Shortrun
terms of  trade  deteriorates  Improves  improvement/ improvement/ Improves Improves Improves
longrun longrun
decline decline
1The partial equilibrium model does not capture bilateral trade flows. A reduction in EU agricultural imports implies lower
U.S. agricultural exports, so the impact on the U.S. is concluded to be “likely  trade diverting.”
2Results are from an intertemporal dynamic CGE model. The numbers are obtained for the short-term equilibrium. The
effects of NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and the Uruguay Round of the GATT are included in both scenarios. The differences
between the two scenarios are caused by whether the U.S. joins the  FTAA.
3Results of the regional case study are from a recursive dynamic CGE model. Results reported are for 2020, and take into
account the exogenous capital, labor, and productivity growth that occur between 1992 and 2020.U.S. terms of trade in agriculture are likely to improve
(table 5).   In the FTAA, U.S. agricultural terms of
trade may decline in the long run as agricultural pro-
ductivity gains in Latin American countries increase
their competitiveness in third markets  and assuming
U.S. trade-linked productivity gains are relatively
small  but this economic growth also further stimu-
lates their agricultural trade with the United States. 
RTAs in which the United States does not participate
have mixed effects on U.S. agriculture.  Liapis and
Tsigas find that U.S. agriculture is hurt by the trade
diversion that results from EU expansion, and U.S.
farm exports decline. U.S. agricultural terms of trade
improve because increased subsidized production in
new EU members causes U.S. agricultural import
prices to fall by more than export prices.  Leetmaa,
Jones, and Seeley find that declining EU agricultural
import demand is likely to reduce U.S. farm exports.
In the case of the FTAA, economic growth will benefit
U.S. agriculture even if the United States does not par-
ticipate in the FTAA, but it gains more by participat-
ing.  Diao, Somwaru, and Raney find that U.S. agri-
cultural exports and imports would increase by 6 and
3.2 percent, respectively, if it does not participate,
compared with 7.9 and 6.4 percent, respectively, if the
United States joins the FTAA.  That is, if the United
States joins the FTAA, U.S. farmers can achieve an
additional 2-percent increase in agricultural exports,
and U.S. consumers benefit from an additional 3-per-
cent increase in agricultural imports in the short run.
EU expansion and the FTAA, with and without the
United States, both have important effects on increased
export competition for the United States in third mar-
kets.  The expansion of the EU to include the CEEC
countries results in lower U.S. agricultural exports to
both the EU and third countries.  In the case of the
FTAA, this competition is likely to become keener if
the United States participates in the regional free trade
area.  This is because the technological advances in
our FTAA partners that are linked to trade are likely to
be larger if they have greater opportunities to integrate
their economies with the U.S. economy through trade
and capital investment.  (It is assumed that U.S. trade-
linked productivity growth is lower than in its less
developed partners in the FTAA.  Sources of U.S. pro-
ductivity growth that are not trade-linked are not taken
into account in this model.)  In the FTAA analysis, the
gains in U.S. exports are greater in the short and medi-
um run, compared with the long run, when sustained
technological change in our FTAA partners increases
their export supply.  While this analysis highlights the
effects of an FTAA on increased competition for the
United States, it also shows the importance of econom-
ic growth and development in these countries for stim-
ulating their demand for U.S. farm exports.
Until recently, agriculture has been excluded or given
special treatment in most RTAs.  Yet, the comprehen-
sive inclusion of agriculture is a source of much of the
expected gains from RTAs.  This is because tariffs and
nontariff barriers are relatively high in agriculture, and
the gains from liberalization are more or less propor-
tional to the size of the initial trade distortions. Coyle
and Wang find that agriculture accounts for more than
75 percent of total U.S. welfare gains from APEC
because of high initial rates of protection.  ASEANs
trade-weighted agricultural import tariff was 43 per-
cent in 1992, Chinas was 44 percent, and Japans was
76 percent.  Gehlhar also finds that food and agricul-
ture contribute significantly to U.S. terms of trade
gains under an APEC preferential agreement.  When
the relatively high APEC tariff barriers are removed,
rising APEC demand for U.S. farm products raises the
U.S. agricultural export price and offsets the rising
price of manufacturing imports from Asian members
of APEC.  However,  U.S. agriculture contributes a
negative terms-of-trade impact if APEC adopts open
regionalism because of increased competition from
free riders.  
Agriculture is affected more than other sectors from
regional integration in the Western Hemisphere.
Diao, Somwaru, and Raney find that, with or without
U.S. participation in the FTAA, U.S. agricultural
imports and exports will increase more than trade in
other sectors, increasing the share of agriculture in
total U.S. trade.  In their analysis of EU expansion,
Liapis and Tsigas find that its impact on third coun-
tries, including the United States, is proportionately
greatest in their agricultural sectors.  In most cases,
agricultural production and exports decline, while non-
agricultural exports are hardly affected.  Burfisher,
Robinson, and Thierfelder find that the greater market
orientation of agriculture within NAFTA has increased
the allocative efficiency gains from regional free trade.
In Mexico, the domestic farm program reforms linked
to NAFTA are critical: agriculture can now generate
allocative efficiency gains that are large enough to off-
set terms-of-trade losses, enabling Mexico to achieve a
welfare gain, instead of a loss, from NAFTA. 
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Farm Policy Linkages
The studies in this report focus on four important link-
ages between RTAs and domestic policy.   First, the
arbitrage that will occur under regional free trade will
create tremendous pressures on RTA members to
reduce, decouple, or harmonize their farm support.  In
effect, RTAs limit the ability of members to maintain
independent farm programs that are coupled to, or
influence, farm production or trade.
Countries have commonly used policies such as input
subsidies, guaranteed government purchases or support
prices, consumer subsidies, import protection, and
export subsidies to achieve such objectives as higher
farm prices and rural incomes, and to maintain rural
employment.  Often, in developing countries, farm
subsidies are also linked to overvalued exchange rates
and are an attempt to correct an urban bias in domestic
policies.  Coupled policies become problematic in an
RTA: they rely on import controls to be effective or
affordable, they undermine the export market of the
partner, or they redistribute quota rents to trade part-
ners (table 6).  If, for example, a member of an RTA
tries to maintain a different price level from its partner
through guaranteed prices or government stocks, then
imports from the partner country with the lower price
will tend to enter its market.  Increased imports will
drive down the members domestic price and drive up
the costs of its price support policies.  If the member
country can afford the support program, it in effect
bears at least some of the cost of supporting its part-
ners producers as well.  Domestic production subsi-
dies may be considered to be outside the scope of a
regional trade agreement, but by increasing domestic
supply, they can in effect reduce the demand for
imports from the RTA partner and create tensions
within the union.
NAFTA provides an example of the problems resulting
from incompatible farm programs because the agree-
ment has both substantially freed regional agricultural
trade and allowed the domestic farm programs of its
individual members to remain in place.  Since NAFTA
was signed in 1993, however, all three members have
autonomously moved to reduce or eliminate farm sup-
port, and most remaining support has been decoupled
from production or prices.  Before NAFTA, Mexico
had a system of guaranteed producer prices for key
crops, and provided subsidies to millers that compen-
sated them for the high cost of domestic corn and
wheat relative to imports.  In the 1980s, Mexicos
imports were relatively cheap because of both fixed
domestic prices and its overvalued exchange rate.  In
anticipation of the effects of free trade on its guaran-
teed price program for corn and beans, Mexico con-
verted its price support programs into direct payments.
Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder estimate that
Mexicos farm program costs would have increased
135 percent due to increased farm imports under
NAFTA if it had not restructured its farm programs.
NAFTA members remaining farm support programs
have predictably led to some trade disputes among
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Table 6 — Effects of free trade on farm support programs  
Support program  Impact of free trade on farm policy 
Per unit production subsidy  Subsidy increases domestic supply and lowers import demand from RTA 
partner.
Guaranteed producer price  With fixed producer price, there is no change in domestic supply due to RTA,
and consumer subsidy  but cheaper imports from RTA partner drive up cost of subsidizing consumers to
purchase domestic product.
Price support through  High domestic price support induces imports from RTA partner and drives up
government stocks  support costs.
Production or marketing   Domestic producers have fixed output, but face lower prices if imports increase
quota under the RTA: quota rents are redistributed to foreigners.
Direct payments  Decoupled policy has no effect on adjustments of production and trade due to RTA.
Source: Adapted from Sumner and Hallstrom (1997).them.   
The EU provides an example of how countries can
choose to harmonize their domestic policies as they
allow free regional trade.  Liapis and Tsigas analyze
the expansion of the EU to include the Central and
Eastern European countries.  In addition to the elimi-
nation of internal trade barriers, EU enlargement
entails harmonization of trade barriers against third
countries, the harmonization of domestic farm policies
under the CAP (leading to common prices), and a
common budget to finance agricultural support. This
common sharing of support costs can lead to unequal
and unsustainable fiscal burdens.  Liapis and Tsigas
find that extending the CAP to the CEEC countries
will cost current EU members $16.2 billion.  This will
likely create pressures for reforming the CAP as it is
extended to new members, and this would reduce the
trade-diverting effects of EU expansion on U.S. agri-
culture.      
A second linkage is that the reduction in farm support
levels and the greater market orientation of many
countries farm sectors over the past decade have
reduced the inherent conflicts between farm support
and free trade.  Since the mid-1980s, many countries
have adopted policy reforms intended to make their
farm sectors more market oriented and competitive in
global markets.  In the Western Hemisphere, in partic-
ular, agricultural support has been dramatically
reduced, eliminated, or decoupled.  On one hand, this
likely accounts for the more comprehensive treatment
of agriculture in recent RTAs.  While earlier RTAs,
such as the European Free Trade Area (EFTA),
1
excluded agricultural products, most RTAs formed in
the last 10 years treat agriculture more comprehensive-
ly, particularly in the Western Hemisphere.  In a case
study of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement,
Michael Kurtzig and Daniel Pick analyze how the
treatment of agriculture has evolved over time in a sin-
gle agreement, including its more comprehensive treat-
ment of more difficult, nontariff trade barriers.
Conversely, by entering into free trade agreements that
include agriculture, countries are effectively locking in
the reforms that they have implemented in their farm
sectors.  Market arbitrage within a free trade area acts
as a discipline on internal subsidies by making some
ineffective or too costly to restore.   
Third, domestic farm policy reforms can increase the
efficiency gains that can be achieved under RTAs.
Farm policies such as guaranteed prices, government
stock holding, and export subsidies tend to insulate
farmers from market price signals and prevent the re-
allocation of resources that is a source of gains from
free trade.  Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder ana-
lyze the separate and combined effects of NAFTA and
recent farm program reforms in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico.  In all three countries, the
impacts of farm program reforms alone are greater
than the impacts of NAFTA on agricultural output and
trade.  However, the shift toward decoupled farm pro-
grams has caused producers to become more respon-
sive to changing market prices due to NAFTA, and
this has increased efficiency gains from the RTA.
Under decoupled farm programs, the greater magni-
tude of agricultural resource reallocation in response to
NAFTA leads to larger welfare gains for the United
States and Canada.  In the case of Mexico, the new
farm programs enable Mexico to gain from NAFTA.
With a more market-oriented farm sector, Mexicos
allocative efficiency gains offset its terms of trade
losses from NAFTA.  Without farm program reforms,
Mexican welfare would have declined under NAFTA.
It is the combined effects of NAFTA and farm pro-
gram reforms that may account for the perception that
NAFTA has had large impacts on the regions farm
sectors.  
Fourth, trade liberalization within an RTA is, in many
cases, not the only policy reform being implemented,
making the effects of RTAs difficult to isolate.  In
some countries, economy-wide reforms that include
removing or reducing domestic taxes and subsidies
and unilateral trade policy reforms pre-date the forma-
tion of an RTA.  These reforms create the conditions
for rapid growth in some regions trade and economies
even before the RTA, and may themselves have built
up pressures to open up markets through RTAs.
Vollraths analysis of the effects of RTAs on agricul-
tural trade finds that increased integration and region-
alization of trade occurred in both MERCOSUR and
APEC prior to formal agreements.  In other cases
(Australia-New Zealand CER and CUSTA) a sharp
rise in intraregional agricultural trade occurred after
the agreement.  This suggests that those RTAs had an
important influence on trade and, according to
Vollrath, were net trade creating.   
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1The EFTA free trade agreement, established in 1960 and
which now includes Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and
Liechtenstein, excluded agriculture from the removal of
internal trade barriers.Thomas Worth examines the effects of RTAs on for-
eign direct investment (FDI) and argues that domestic
policy reforms other than regional trade liberalization
have been more important in influencing investment in
some cases.  For example, the enactment of NAFTA
did not represent a large policy change for the United
States, Canada, or Mexico.  Canada and the United
States had liberal trade and investment policies before
NAFTA.  Mexicos reduction in its trade and invest-
ment restrictions in 1989 had led to a tripling of U.S.
investment in Mexico from 1989 to 1993, but little
additional investment occurred after the enactment of
NAFTA, due in large part to the currency crisis.  In the
MERCOSUR countries, the changes in FDI appear to
have correlated more with changes in macroeconomic
policies than with the formation of an RTA.  The case
of AFTA is unique in that large increases in FDI and
trade in the region led to the trade agreement instead
of the other way around.  H. Christine Bolling ana-
lyzes U.S. FDI in food processing industries in the
three major RTAs: EU, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA.
Her findings corroborate Worths argument that joining
an RTA does not necessarily bring new FDI: economic
growth, market size, and changing consumer tastes
have more direct effects on investment, although an
RTA can affect these key determinants.  
RTA’s and Agriculture:
Building Blocks or Stumbling
Blocks to Multilateralism?
The debate over the role of RTAs as building blocks
or stumbling blocks for multilateralism has an immedi-
acy for global agriculture because of the commitment
to begin a WTO mini-round on agriculture in 1999.
An RTA acts as a building block by either prompting
an acceleration in multilateral negotiations, or adding
new members and converging on globalism.
Stumbling blocks do the opposite.  We emphasize a
third relationship between RTAs and multilateralism:
their complementary and mutually reinforcing impacts
in liberalizing agricultural trade.
Sheffield describes the concurrent progress made on
agricultural trade liberalization in  RTAs and under the
Uruguay Round.  Until recently, RTAs largely exempt-
ed agriculture from regional trade liberalization, with
the notable exception of the European Union.  But
over the past decade, many RTAs, particularly in the
Western Hemisphere, have been comprehensive in
their liberalization of agriculture, eliminating both tar-
iff and nontariff barriers, and going substantially fur-
ther than their WTO commitments.  By opening their
agriculture to regional free trade, member countries
farm sectors are already making adjustments to open
markets.  This reduces the remaining burden of adjust-
ment posed by multilateral trade reforms, and promis-
es to build a constituency for further agricultural trade
liberalization at the mini-round.  
The ability of RTAs to omit agriculture was also cir-
cumscribed by the Uruguay Round. The exclusion or
limited liberalization of agriculture by RTAs was pos-
sible in part because of the many other holes in the
GATT agreement regarding trade restrictions on agri-
cultural products, such as waivers on quantitative
import restrictions if they interfered with domestic
supply control policies.  A significant accomplishment
of the Uruguay Round was to close some of these
holes by imposing disciplines on agricultural trade bar-
riers and trade-distorting domestic farm policies.
Leetmaa, Jones, and Seeley discuss the important role
that stronger multilateral disciplines are having in
influencing the direction of farm program reforms in
the EU.  EU expansion and the prospect of extending
the CAP to new members from Central and Eastern
Europe has the potential to massively increase EU
farm program expenditures.  Budget pressures are a
key factor in instigating a reduction in EU farm subsi-
dies, but the direction of this reform is being defined
by the commitment in the Uruguay Round to decou-
ple, and to reduce the trade-distorting effects of
domestic subsidies.  
In a second example, Michael Kurtzig and Daniel Pick
analyze the 1996 revision of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade
Area Agreement to provide for greater access for U.S.
agricultural products.  The 1996 Agreement on Food
and Agriculture (AFA) was motivated partly by
Israels failure to fully implement the terms of the
1985 agreement.  It was also an effort to bring the
1985 agreement into compliance with the new rules of
the Uruguay Round governing agricultural trade.  The
AFA dealt mainly with removal of nontariff barriers,
which had been permitted by the 1985 agreement but
are no longer allowed under the WTO.
The U.S.-Japan beef negotiations offer an additional
example of the importance of a credible multilateral
process in influencing the successful outcome of a
bilateral trade agreement.  John Dyck provides a case
study of U.S.-Japan beef negotiations: these were nar-
rowly focused discussions that successfully dealt with
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Japan signed an agreement to phase out Japans quota
system for  beef.  The agreement is viewed as of major
consequence because of the size of Japans beef
imports and because of the length and intensity of the
negotiations, which took place sporadically over 20
years.  The U.S.-Japan negotiations on beef and the
Tokyo Round were closely connected.  While there
was no formal link between these bilateral talks and
the Uruguay Round of the GATT, Dyck argues that the
bilateral agreement could only have been achieved
with the credible threat of GATT actions against Japan.
In the early 1980s, U.S. complaints to the GATT
about Japanese trade practices not related to beef were
one form of leverage that influenced Japanese deci-
sions on beef.  Conversely, Dyck argues that the 1988
agreement may have influenced the outcome of the
Uruguay Round, since, for U.S. agriculture, the suc-
cessful performance of U.S. exports to Japan provided
additional evidence that U.S. agriculture could gain
from freer world trade. 
The Uruguay Round also strengthened the multilateral
oversight of RTAs.  RTAs represent a major deroga-
tion of the most favored nation principle of the GATT.
They are allowed under Article 24 of the GATT, which
places constraints on RTAs that are intended to foster
their trade-creating characteristics, while minimizing
their trade-diverting impacts.  Article 24 allows RTAs
provided that  (1) no external tariffs are raised, (2)
substantially all barriers to trade between partners are
removed, and (3) a reasonable time frame is estab-
lished for the complete implementation of the agree-
ment.  GATT treatment of RTAs has been criticized
because of the ambiguity of these provisions.  For
example, it was not clear what constituted substan-
tially all trade, nor was it specified whether tariffs
referred to applied tariffs or to average or weighted
rates.  Under a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) signed during the Uruguay Round, tariff rates
and adjustment periods were defined more specifically.  
RTAs now must be reported to the WTO Committee
on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), which was
formed in 1996.  So far, the CRTA has devoted much
of its time to developing a systematic approach to RTA
notification and review, as well as identifying areas
where greater clarification is required.  At the same
time, the CRTA has also had to examine the backlog of
new or existing RTAs reported since the formation of
the WTO.  It is too early to say how well the CRTA
will be able to perform its surveillance role given the
amount of work and the difficulty in addressing these
issues. 
The more comprehensive treatment of agriculture in
recent RTAs, and their net trade-creating impacts, sug-
gests that RTAs are playing a positive role in liberaliz-
ing global trade.  Nevertheless,  a strong multilateral
process is likely to remain important  both to mini-
mize trade-diverting characteristics of RTAs, and to
define or constrain the unfinished agendas in some
RTAs.  In Latin America, for example, RTAs are rap-
idly proliferating, and the effects of these criss-cross-
ing preferential tariff rates is uncertain.  Stout and
Ugaz-Pereda analyze agricultural tariffs in four Latin
American RTAs, and identify tariff-related issues.  In
MERCOSUR, the RTA both lowered the agricultural
tariffs of Argentina and Brazil against nonmembers,
and eliminated tariff escalation, in which tariffs on
processed goods are higher than on bulk agricultural
products.  But, the common external tariff of MERCO-
SUR was increased in late 1997, at least temporarily,
signaling the ability of the members to achieve con-
sensus on raising trade barriers.  In Chile, the overlap-
ping tariffs that result from its network of bilateral
trade agreements require complicated rules of origin
(ROOs).  ROOs are particularly difficult to enforce in
agriculture because of the homogeneity of bulk agri-
cultural products, and can easily become a form of dis-
guised protection. Both the Andean Pact and the
Central American Common Market (CACM) have
adopted common external tariffs that provide tariff
escalation, making it difficult to compete in their
processed food markets.  One of the main objectives
of an FTAA would be to reconcile and simplify the
increasingly complex system of Latin American tariffs.  
What APEC will look like when fully implemented is
another important question for the global economy.
From the U.S. perspective, inclusion of agriculture in
APEC is critical because of the high protection rates in
East Asia.  APEC has set a goal of free trade in agri-
cultural products for developed members by 2010, and
for less developed members by 2020, but no interim or
staged reductions have been specified.  Some mem-
bers, including Mexico and Chile, already have low
agricultural trade barriers and are reducing or eliminat-
ing farm support.  Other APEC members have contin-
ued to protect their agricultural sectors.  It is difficult
to predict whether APEC will achieve its goals in agri-
culture.  Some of APECs agricultural trade liberaliza-
tion will probably coincide with the multilateral nego-
tiations under the mini-round in agriculture.  The two
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help to make APECs agricultural trade liberalization
more concrete, while the APEC commitment to free
agricultural trade may help to define the goals of the
mini-round.    
This report (and its companionAER-771) provides
an economic evaluation of major RTAs, but the politi-
cal economy of regional trade agreements is also
important in understanding how they may affect the
multilateral process.  The political economy character-
istics of RTAs are not yet well understood: there are
opposing views as to how some important characteris-
tics influence the dynamic path of the RTA.  These are
the key elements of the debate: Is the motivation for
an RTA to open markets, and to complement or lock in
other market-oriented policies, or is the RTA protec-
tionist in character?  Does an RTA create or strengthen
interest groups that benefit from trade diversion and
have incentives to lobby against free trade? Organized
producer groups can effectively capture the national
policy agenda, and divert it toward protecting producer
interests. As RTAs continue to expand, are large blocs
likely to exert market power to improve their terms of
trade, and thereby lose the incentive to move toward
global free trade? Or are large blocs better able to
negotiate global free trade?  Is admission to the RTA
open, so that any nonmember who is negatively affect-
ed by the RTA can eliminate trade diversion impacts
by joining?  Or, does open admission seduce members
into regional initiatives and divert their political ener-
gies from multilateral initiatives?  Does free trade
within the RTA result in deeper integration of policies
and institutions, and is this deeper integration around
trade-creating or trade-diverting policies?  
Whether RTAs are more beneficial for the United
States than multilateralism is a fundamental policy
issue.  Because the United States is a global trader
with diverse trade partners, it can potentially gain
more from global free trade than from regional trade
agreements.  But so far, multilateral talks have fallen
far short of achieving free trade, and the gains to the
United States from the deeper commitments made by
RTAs are expected to exceed those from the Uruguay
Round. But the influence of RTAs on the multilateral
process is still uncertain, and they hold the potential to
harm nonmembers.  Because the two processes can
provide important, mutually reinforcing influences,
their joint pursuit can benefit U.S. agriculture.
References
Baldwin, Richard E., and Anthony Venables (1995).
Regional Economic Integration, in Handbook of
International Economics.  Vol. 3: 1597-1644.  Elsevier
Science: Amsterdam.
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1991).  The World Trading System
at Risk.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Josling, Timothy (1997). Implications of Regional
Trade Arrangements for Agriculture.  FAO Economic
and Social Development Paper No. 133.  Rome: FAO.
Josling, Timothy (1998).  The Role of Regionalism in
Agricultural Trade Reform.  Unpublished paper pre-
sented to INEA, Rome, March.
Sumner, Daniel, and Daniel Hallstrom (1977).
Commodity Policy Compatibility with Free Trade
Agreements, paper prepared for the Conference on
Policy Harmonization/Convergence/Compatibility,
Tucson, Arizona.  
Viner, Jacob (1950). The Customs Union Issue.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:  New
York. 
Winters, L. Alan (1996).  Regionalism versus
Multilateralism.  Policy Research Working Paper No.
1687.  World Bank: Washington, DC.
World Trade Organization (1995).  Regionalism and
the World Trading System.  Geneva, Switzerland. 
16 U Economic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture: Overview/AIB-745  Appendix: The Economics of
Regional Integration
The concepts of trade creation and trade diversion
form the core of economic analyses of RTAs.  Trade
creation can occur within an RTA.  Production effi-
ciency improves when RTA members import more
from lower cost RTA partners, and less efficient
domestic production falls. Consumption efficiency
improves when consumers in an RTA can buy imports
at prices that are lower than those for domestic prod-
ucts.  As a hypothetical example, assume an RTA is
formed between Guatemala, an efficient coffee pro-
ducer that can produce wheat only with intensive and
costly irrigation, and Nicaragua, an efficient wheat
producer that can produce coffee only in greenhouses.
An RTA creates trade if it results in greater Nicaraguan
imports of relatively low-cost Guatemalan coffee, and
a shift in Nicaraguan farm production from hot-house
coffee into wheat.  Guatemala gains if it imports more
relatively low-cost Nicaraguan wheat, and grows less
of its intensively irrigated domestic wheat. Nicaraguan
consumers gain because of the decline in the price of
coffee, while Guatemalan consumers gain from the
lower price of wheat.  
Trade diversion occurs when RTA members shift their
imports from more efficient, nonmember producers, to
less efficient partner countries within the RTA.  This
reduces the worlds production efficiency, and hurts
consumers within the RTA, who now import from
high-cost members of the RTA.  In the example of
Nicaragua and Guatemala, assume that prior to form-
ing an RTA, Nicaragua had identical tariffs on its
imports of cocoa from all sources.  Assume that at that
tariff, Nicaragua imported its cocoa from Mexico,
which produced it at lower cost than Guatemala.  After
the RTA, trade diversion would occur if Nicaragua
shifts its cocoa imports from Mexico to Guatemala.  In
this case, the removal of Nicaraguan tariffs gives
Guatemalas higher cost cocoa an advantage over
Mexican cocoa in the Nicaraguan market.  Nicaraguan
consumers pay less for duty-free cocoa imports under
the RTA, but when lost tariff revenue is also accounted
for, Nicaragua has net losses from trade diversion.   
RTAs can either benefit or harm nonmembers.
Efficiency gains and increased real income within the
RTA may increase the RTAs demand for imports.
This is trade expansion, and it can benefit nonmem-
bers.  Conversely, both producers and consumers in
nonmember countries are hurt by trade diversion.
Production efficiency declines if nonmember countries
must now produce goods they formerly imported at
lower cost from RTA members.  In the case of Mexico
and Nicaragua, the shift of Nicaraguan wheat exports
to Guatemala reduces export availability for Mexico,
and causes Mexico to shift to wheat production and
out of cocoa, the crop in which Mexico has an interna-
tional comparative advantage.  Mexicos consumption
efficiency declines because it must now pay for higher
cost domestic wheat.    
Most RTAs have both trade-creating and trade-divert-
ing impacts.  Whether the trade-creation or the trade-
diversion effect dominates depends on many factors,
including production cost differences, rates of initial
tariffs, and relative supply and demand responses (app.
table 1).  For example, if an RTA is formed between
two countries with very different costs of production,
there would be large potential gains as production
shifted to lower cost producers.   
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Appendix table 1 —An RTA tends to be more trade creating than trade distorting...
the larger are unit production costs differences within the RTA 
the smaller are cost differences between members and nonmembers 
the higher the pre-RTA tariff  
the lower the post-RTA tariff that is set between the RTA and nonmembers
the greater the member country’s supply and demand responsiveness, in the case of trade creation 
the more competitive the pre-RTA structure of members’ economies due to tariffs 
the larger the initial trade flows between complementary or “natural” partners Terms-of-Trade Effects
If the RTA is large enough in world markets to affect
the prices of its imports and exports, or if the costs of
production increase as production expands, there can
also be terms-of-trade effects.  Terms of trade refers
to the relative prices of imports and exports.  An RTA
is likely to improve the terms of trade for members
and lower them for the rest of the world.  This is one
of the primary concerns that nonmembers have about
RTAs.  In the example of the RTA between Nicaragua
and Guatemala, decreased Nicaraguan demand for
Mexican cocoa might lower its price.  Likewise, the
shift of Nicaraguan wheat exports to Guatemala could
reduce the availability, and raise the price, of Mexicos
wheat imports from Nicaragua.  While Nicaragua loses
from the diversion of its imports from Mexico to
Guatemala, its full cost would be reduced by its
improved terms of trade with Mexico.  That is, the
Nicaraguan wheat export price to Mexico has risen,
while its cocoa import price from Mexico has
declined.  Conversely, the trade diversion causes
Mexicos terms of trade to worsen.  Terms-of-trade
changes are key to understanding the distributional
impacts of an RTA:  the costs of trade diversion can be
partially, or even fully, borne by nonmembers if their
terms of trade deteriorate.  
Trade creation, trade diversion, and terms-of-trade
effects constitute the welfare impacts of an RTA (app.
table 2). Welfare refers to the efficiency of resource
use in production, and the ability of consumers to sat-
isfy their preferences.   
RTA’s as Building Blocks or Stumbling
Blocks to Multilateralism
The effects of RTAs on the multilateral trade liberal-
ization process have generated intense debate.  Just as
Viner (1950) influenced the debate over customs
unions by articulating the twin concepts of trade cre-
ation and trade diversion, Bhagwati (1991) has influ-
enced the debate over regionalism by developing a
time path conceptualization of  RTAs as building
blocks or stumbling blocks to the multilateral freeing
of trade.  Building blocks contribute to multilateralism
by adding new members or by prompting an accelera-
tion in multilateral trade negotiations.  Stumbling
blocks do the opposite.  Economic theory is still
engaged in identifying the characteristics of RTAs that
are likely to make them building blocks or stumbling
blocks to multilateralism (app. table 3).  For many of
the characteristics considered relevant, there are
opposing views as to how they influence the dynamic
path of the RTA. 
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Appendix table 2 — Welfare impacts of regional trade agreements  
Trade creation  Production shifts to lowest cost producer in RTA
Consumption shifts from domestic goods to  imports from RTA partner
Trade diversion  Production shifts to RTA member, as imports decline from lower cost, nonmember 
exporter; if an importer, nonmember’s production increases, as RTA exports shift to 
partner destination
Consumption by RTA members shifts to imports from higher cost RTA partner;
consumption by nonmembers shifts to higher cost domestic products  
Terms-of-trade effects  Market size or nonconstant costs affect prices of imports relative to exports Economic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AIB-745 U  19
Appendix table 3 — Are regional trade agreements stumbling blocks or 
building blocks to free trade?
RTA’s are building blocks when...
...they reinforce or lock in domestic policy reforms 
...they have open admission and outsiders are motivated to join
...they tackle issues that are too deep or complex for multilateral negotiations
...as large blocks, they influence negotiations toward free trade
...deeper integration of policies and institutions creates trade
...non-members receive unconditional MFN status.
RTA’s are stumbling blocks when...
...they create interest groups that benefit from trade diversion
...they divert political capital from multilateral initiatives
...as large blocks, they exert market power to improve terms of trade for members 
...they block additional members to preserve trade gains 
...they maintain external trade preferences
...deeper integration of protectionist policies diverts trade.